

MULTILEVEL EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE: ENABLING ADAPTIVE AND AGILE RESPONSES

Emergency Governance for Cities and Regions

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POLICY BRIEF

THE INITIATIVE

This policy brief is part of the Emergency Governance Initiative (EGI) led by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the World Association of the Major Metropolises (Metropolis) and LSE Cities at the London School of Economics and Political Science. This initiative investigates the institutional dimensions of rapid and radical action in response to complex global emergencies. The EGI aims to provide city and regional governments with actionable information and appropriate frameworks, knowledge and resources to navigate the new demands of leading responses to complex emergencies.

POLICY BRIEF #04

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This is the fourth in a series of regular publications that complement the more data-driven Analytics Notes. Policy Briefs focus on forward-looking propositions, reform agendas, governance innovation and critical perspectives.

This policy brief 'Multilevel Emergency Governance: Enabling Adaptive and Agile Responses' has been prepared in consultation with representatives from city and regional governments facilitated by a series of workshops that were held between April and June 2021. Participating local governments included Paris, Santiago de Chile, Medellín, Rosario, Johannesburg, Berlin, Montreal, Moscow, Mexico City, Cairo, Ramallah, Bogotá, Cotopaxi, Istanbul, Barcelona, Ville de Dori, Kazan, Madrid, Ethekewini Municipality and Belo Horizonte. Participating local government associations included Council of Governors, Kenya; the Local Governments association of New Zealand; the Union of Municipalities in Turkey; the Federation of Canadian Municipalities; the South African Local Government Association (SALGA); CONGOPE, Ecuador; Governors Association of Korea; and SALAR, Sweden. Representatives from UNDP Country offices, national and local government participated from Pakistan, Iraq, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Colombia, Chad, Nigeria and Kenya.

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1 INTRODUCTION

Any effective response to complex emergencies centrally depends on the capabilities of state actors. Among the most fundamental of these capabilities is the coordinated action across and within different territories as no single tier of government can effectively address complex emergencies (see Box 1) alone. Recognising the vertical, sectoral and territorial interdependence of actors, multilevel governance is a widely acknowledged foundation for collective decision-making, strategy development and the management of operational aspects of public policy well beyond emergency modes.

A general understanding of multilevel governance does not differentiate between governing under non-emergency or emergency mode. However, tailored arrangements and practices in this regard play a particularly important role in the governance of complex emergencies. As the recent experience with the COVID-19 response as well as much longer climate emergency actions have shown, the distribution of powers and coordination dynamics between different units of government are critical governance factors.

Considering **effective multilevel governance under conditions of emergencies exacerbates many of its fundamental trade-offs.** Above all, this includes the sequencing or simultaneity of government action at different levels as well as territorial synchronisation, alignment and limited regional disparities on the one hand, or flexibility, adaptability and place-based approaches on the other hand. At the same time, **multilevel emergency governance is the only alternative to either excessive recentralisation or territorial fragmentation as part of emergency responses.**

Box 1: Complex Emergencies

Complex emergencies are defined here as long emergencies, which are political in nature and mostly beyond social memory with the potential to erode the cultural, civil, political and economic stability of societies. They are also characterised by a high degree of uncertainty and unknown feedback loops and are difficult to define (a fuller definition is presented in the EGI Policy Brief 02).

This policy brief combines existing material from the Emergency Governance Initiative with additional inputs, concepts and frameworks to establish a preliminary resource, which provides guidance and furthers the debate on multilevel governance and emergency coordination. Above all, new material was developed with the help of three workshops and upfront consultation with representatives from different city, metropolitan, regional and state governments. The workshops are detailed in Table 1 below.

The scope of this policy brief is an exclusive focus on state actors operating across different vertical, sectoral and territorial aspects of a collective response to complex emergencies such as global health emergencies, climate change and various complex social emergencies. Concentrating on the roles of cities, metropolitan and regional governments as part of multilevel emergency governance, this document highlights the dynamics within different national systems rather than the collaboration at supranational, international and global levels. It will also inform an EGI Special Report on Emergency Governance for Cities and Regions to be published in 2022.

It is important to note that this focus does not suggest that international, private/third sector and civil society actors are not central agents under emergency conditions. However, it acknowledges that a certain level of consistency of public policy and government action across the spectrum of national to local government actors is required to set the stage for broader coalitions of support, collaboration and emergency action. The latter will be the focus of future EGI Policy Briefs. At the same time, this policy brief also accepts that some of the key arguments, insights and perspectives presented below may also have relevance for the relationship between federal states and national governments or indeed national governments and supranational entities.

2 EMERGENCY IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

Most cities and regions respond to complex emergencies in partnership with governments across different governance levels. No single level of government is likely to have the capacity to address complex emergencies alone. As recent analysis of the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, ‘strong and effective multilevel governance is essential to prevent, identify and manage emergencies’ [1]. Therefore, this policy brief considers responses to complex emergencies as multilevel emergency governance.

Table 1: Workshops

	Co-hosting organisation	Focus	Date	No. of participants	No. of countries represented
Workshop 1	UCLG	Perspective of cities and regions	28/04/21	28	16
Workshop 2	Metropolis	Role of metropolitan-level governments	07/06/21	13	10
Workshop 3	UNDP	Role of national and local governments	30/06/21	23	9

2.1 THE CHALLENGE

Emergency governance involves rapid and radical intervention by governments which can be at odds with fundamental principles of cooperative multilevel governance. For example, such principles include a shift from direct policy control to policy coordination [2] and collaborative decision-making, joint production, common interests, value creation rather than advancing a narrow political agenda [3]. Furthermore, during an emergency, a shift towards negotiated, non-hierarchical exchanges between actors with better alignment of interests and greater coordinating capacities [4] may not be possible without considerable experiences prior to entering emergency mode.

The recent experiences with the **COVID-19 response demonstrated that many cities and regions were able to establish the necessary governance innovation and flexibility** and thereby supported efforts by their national and state-level governments. While this also involved some friction between different government entities, the degree to which it led to productive learning or sustained tension varied significantly. Still, in an EGI survey of 57 cities and regions conducted in July 2020, one of the most commonly cited administrative governance challenges in relation to the emergency response was the difficulty of working across tiers of government.

Similarly, 71% of the 300 European cities and regions surveyed by the European Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the OECD said that lack of coordination with other levels of government, both vertical and horizontal, was one of the main challenges they experienced during the emergency. Only 49% believed that vertical coordination mechanisms with national governments had been effective. One-third of respondents said that cross-border cooperation between subnational governments was either ineffective or non-existent, whilst only 22% found coordination at the subnational government to be effective [5].

The governance of complex emergencies is also confronted with a range of obstacles to effective multilevel public policy that have been observed under normal mode governance [6]. In many instances, these obstacles are even further intensified:

- **Information gaps:** different levels of government do not have access to the same quality or quantity of information. Information gaps can become even wider when acting under time pressure.
- **Capacity gaps:** lack of human, knowledge or infrastructural resources that cannot be easily addressed during emergency responses.
- **Fiscal/funding gaps:** lack of resources, particularly at lower levels of government, which becomes more pronounced as complex emergencies usually impact negatively on socio-economic development.
- **Administrative gaps:** administrative boundaries do not match functional, social or economic areas, which can lead to fragmentation of public policies. This fragmentation risk significantly increases when ad-hoc decision-making prevents coordinated approaches across jurisdictions.

- **Policy gaps:** lack of cross-sectoral approaches to policy-making and implementation. Policy coherence in the absence of centralised powers and strong hierarchies is once again particularly difficult to achieve for rapid and radical intervention.

These challenges establish the difficult terrain within which multilevel emergency governance has to operate. **Three inter-related emergency governance issues [7] play a particularly important role in establishing appropriate approaches to multilevel governance** capable of effectively responding to complex emergencies:

1. the **decentralisation question** considers the appropriate level to make decisions. It is often suggested that centralisation may, under certain circumstances, be beneficial for coordination, while devolved decision-making is more suitable for facilitating adaptivity to local contexts and developing tailored policies.
2. the **time question** considers the timing of decision-making and sequencing of emergency responses. While rapid decisions and action may be essential to prevent escalation, it also risks a lower quality of decisions and the creation of lock-ins preventing future alternative responses.
3. the **stability question** considers that emergency responses require governance change while creating frictions with institutional stability, trusted established relationships, the preservation of routines and processes, and predictability of bureaucracies [8].

2.2 TOWARDS MULTILEVEL EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE

United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) defines multilevel governance as a ‘decision-making system based on coordination mechanisms that allow the allocation of competencies and responsibilities of government both vertically and horizontally in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity and that respect local autonomy’ [9]. Defining characteristics of multilevel governance include the shared decision-making across different territorial levels; interconnected political arenas rather than nested actors [10] and increasing vertical interdependence of actors and horizontal interdependence between government and non-government entities [2].

For the purposes of the EGI, the concept of multilevel emergency governance builds on this general understanding but with the acknowledgment that **complex emergencies require particular governance qualities, above all capacities for adaptive and agile responses** (see Appendix). Adaptivity depends on learning and the capacity for productively extracting lessons from conflicts between different governance entities. It requires tolerance for the paradox of seemingly incompatible governance change such as decentralisation and centralisation at the same time [7]. Agility implies a shift from slower plan-based, step-by-step interventions to establishing an initial strategy that is followed by a continuous process of improvement based on the latest information [11]. It recognises the advantages of cross-functional teams driven by a strong purpose and commitment to deliver [12].

This general need for flexibility, tailored approaches and governance innovation was also confirmed by all three workshops that informed this policy brief.

Two types of multilevel governance systems can be differentiated [13]:

- **Multi-task and general-purpose jurisdictions:** durable institutions which are mutually exclusive at each territorial level, each level nested within the next.
- **Specialised, task-driven jurisdictions** addressing a limited set of issues (more flexible, less durable).

The first plays an important role under emergency mode to provide the required legitimacy and stability of government and often leads to a split between strategic (higher-level governments) and operational roles (regional and local governments). **During an emergency, these two types of governance systems often coexist, with an executive command centre performing a generalised governance role and specialised units addressing different elements of the response.** The latter can be attached to existing bodies as in the case of the London Councils in the UK or the Association of German Cities bringing together local authorities collectively inputting on strategic emergency governance. In Rosario, Argentina, a Risk Management Council came into force at the outset of the pandemic. This executive body, chaired by the mayor, is a multi-task institution, designed to coordinate strategies to mitigate the virus and its impacts.

The following two dimensions of multilevel governance are most relevant to consider under emergency conditions. Each includes three key subcomponents and together establish the focus of Sections 3 and 4 below.

1. the **shifting of powers** between different government entities to adapt to emergency needs considering three fundamental types of powers (see Appendix for further details):
 - a. **Political powers**
 - b. **Administrative powers**
 - c. **Fiscal powers**
2. the **coordination of responses** between different government entities to join up emergency action considering three different directions of coordination (see Appendix for further details):
 - a. **Vertical coordination**
 - b. **Sectoral coordination**
 - c. **Territorial coordination**

Once a government at any level transitions to emergency mode fundamental questions about multilevel emergency governance in relation to the two dimensions above need to be addressed.

3 SHIFTING POWERS: ADAPTING GOVERNMENT REMITS TO EMERGENCY NEEDS

Swift and effective emergency response challenges the established balance between the roles and powers of different government entities. This can affect the distribution of state powers – legislative, executive and judiciary – and the remits of different levels of governments – political, administrative and fiscal – as well as the bundling of sectoral competencies such as security, health and environmental protection. The consultation and workshops with government representatives involved with the pandemic emergency response confirmed institutional adjustments in relation to strategic decision-making, emergency powers and specific operational aspects. Employing the principles of adaptivity and agility for the proactive and considered adjustment of the roles and powers of government entities under emergency modes can be an important contribution to more effective multilevel emergency governance. Furthermore, emergency responses must take into account feminist approaches in facilitating collaborative decision-making processes and counterbalance the tendency to rely on an increased (traditional) top-down approach to governance during crises [14].

3.1 WHY CHANGE ANYTHING?

Typically, multilevel governance systems are calibrated over time to improve their effectiveness, efficiency and transparency across jurisdictions and are adjusted to the requirements of normal-mode policy-making and administration. They are politically negotiated systems determined by prevailing political cultures and the type of national governance system, and often protected by constitutional laws. While any call for multilevel governance reform is motivated by changes in the governance environment and sometimes by strengthening democracy, **adapting the roles and powers of government entities when responding to complex emergencies can target a particular set of objectives:**

1. **Stabilising the core:** emergency governance relies on stable institutions at the heart of government. Prioritising the stability and capability of this core enables greater flexibility and innovation elsewhere across the multilevel governance system.
2. **Radical intervention:** the prioritisation of a single public policy concern is the defining feature of emergency mode governance. Government entities equipped with a particular degree of legitimacy are best positioned to decide on these trade-offs and initiate radical interventions.
3. **Fast and effective decision-making:** the time-critical aspect of emergencies demands fast as well as effective decision-making. A single decision maker can be an advantage, as can government entities experienced in collecting, aggregating and interpreting information.

4. **Equitable emergency responses:** any multilevel governance reforms should be centrally motivated by improving the livelihood of citizens in a more equitable way. Fair and needs-based support and equitable burden-sharing of emergency action increases the public acceptance of long emergency modes.
5. **Experimentation:** addressing complex emergencies requires trialling new and untested approaches to crisis. Zero-failure culture needs to be tamed and replaced by trial-and-error experimental approaches. Government entities must be capable of overseeing explicit experiments such as test beds, policy labs, innovation labs and regulatory sandboxes.
6. **Coordination:** The assignment of powers directly impacts on the coordinating capacity of multilevel governance systems. Adapting existing arrangements to emergency mode needs to centrally consider its impact on coordination capacities while aiming for arrangements that lead to synergised operations.

3.2 POSITIONING CITIES AND REGIONS ACROSS THE VERTICAL EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE SPECTRUM

The roles and powers of city and regional governments vary greatly from country to country. In aggregate terms, they are major government actors: for OECD countries under non-emergency governance, regions and cities account for 40% of public spending and 57% of public investment [15]. **While many cities and regions are equipped with emergency powers for dealing with routine and non-routine emergencies, few have the necessary remits in place to effectively respond to complex emergencies.** Some countries also ensure that certain powers such as requisition are exclusively available to central governments [1]. More generally, when mobilising emergency resources, local governments are typically relying on support by higher-level governments with far greater access to finance and critical capacities.

A typical role for cities and regions during complex emergencies, such as COVID-19, is the operational response on the ground. **Municipalities delivered basic services, provided care for vulnerable people, supported the local economy, enabled solidarity and helped to raise awareness and ensured compliance [1]. In other cases, particularly as part of climate emergency action, cities also take on a more strategic role.** They lead efforts in declaring climate emergencies, make executive decisions in areas where they have fuller control and provide important information in support of greater intervention by higher-level governments. Regional and local governments in the OECD are responsible for 64% of environment- and climate-related public investment [15].

Adapting the role, **responsibilities and type of intervention of city and regional government to the requirements of complex emergencies makes it necessary to consider broader adjustments to the vertical emergency governance spectrum.** Such adjustments will be confronted with the fundamental debate in multilevel governance on the respective advantages of decentralisation and centralisation, which is often portrayed as a

Decentralisation

An enhanced role for cities and regional governments, including strategic emergency response functions, implies decentralisation. As part of emergency responses, decentralisation coupled with strong bottom-up coordination and communication allows for a better consideration of local needs and avoids the one-size-fits-all approach of centralised systems. As was repeatedly noted during the workshops, **successful decentralisation, particularly under emergency conditions, requires access to finance and fully funded mandates where new responsibilities for service delivery and policy making are appropriately resourced.**

Centralisation

Arguments in support of an enhanced role for higher-level governments as part of emergency responses are typically based on advantages of central authority to enable rapid decisions. Centralisation can also reduce overlapping assignments between different levels of government, facilitate economies of scale, and ensure policy coherence. In countries where governance resources are scarce, centralisation allows for the sharing of skills, knowledge and expertise across wider territories, rather than relying on capacity building which takes considerable time. However, it is important to note that addressing longer emergencies requires significant levels of learning and new capacities across all levels of government.

3.3 REDEFINING ROLES

Redefining the roles city, metropolitan and regional governments could play as part of emergency governance is best informed by actual experiences within a given context. Extracting insights and differentiating 'what works' and 'what does not work' can be based on established practices, experimental arrangements or ad-hoc and accidental set-ups. Additionally, **international practices can provide important information on effective roles of cities and regions or specific aspects of emergency governance.**

When incorporating lessons from different national contexts, defining criteria for their helpfulness are shared socio-economic (e.g. income levels), political (e.g. liberal, corporatist or developmental states) and governmental (unitary, federal states) characteristics. For roles as part of multilevel emergency governance, the latter differentiation is a particularly relevant indicator for transferability. At the same time, any drive for decentralisation and the strengthening of the roles of cities and regions as part of emergency responses is likely to identify important lessons from federal systems. A common division identifies 25 UN member states as federal countries (40% of the world population) and 168 as unitary states [18].

For example, research has shown that coordination and administrative challenges differ according to the level of decentralisation. An OECD rapid survey found that more decentralised countries faced more challenges related to coordinating the emergency response with other tiers of government than more centralised countries.

Challenges related to overlapping responsibilities between levels of government and asymmetric impacts or needs were more commonly experienced in countries with higher levels of decentralisation. The only administrative challenges more commonly identified by centralised countries were related to financial compensation.

The recent COVID-19 experience also indicates that while federalist countries were exposed to frictions between different tiers of government, conflicts emerging in more polarised political contexts such as the United States and Brazil were more pronounced [7, 19]. By contrast, decentralisation tensions that were more conducive to learning and productive collaboration were observed in Germany [20]. As conflicts and tensions between levels of government are largely unavoidable in times of crisis, it is important that these are handled in as productive a manner as possible, and that they do not damage key operations or undermine credibility of actors [7].

Furthermore, the appropriate level of centralisation and decentralisation not only depends on the national and regional contexts but may also vary in relation to different policy sectors, the type of complex emergency and the specific moment when the emergency response is being pursued. For example, the pandemic-related interventions were initially driven by decision and action led by central authorities, while later on the roles of local and regional governments became more prominent, with more context-specific approaches [1].

Shifting powers, whether as part of decentralisation or centralisation, are not only due to neutral calculations of efficiency, they are often politically and ideologically motivated. In a survey of city and regional governments conducted by the EGI in July 2020, politicisation of the emergency response was one of the top challenges identified by respondents in relation to democracy, legitimacy and inclusion. **Pre-existing political tensions between actors or institutions within different levels of government can be exacerbated during crisis situations, and the added strain of emergency governance can cause new rivalries to emerge.** More decentralised systems have the possibility of balancing extreme polarisation simply by increasing the number and diversity of political positions that impact on emergency governance.

Finally, **it is important to acknowledge the key role of national governments in centrally informing roles as part of the response to complex emergencies and establishing the relevant legal and regulatory frameworks.** Even in federal states, national governments will maintain their leading roles in 'the design of general policy frameworks and action plans, the overall coordination of public policies, the reallocation of resources from the national budget, the issuance of guidance, international/diplomatic contacts, etc.' [1]. Additional transparency mechanisms set up by national governments can also assist a more effective assignment of roles. One example is the Swedish Corona Commission with a remit to evaluate COVID-19 measures by central government, government agencies and subnational governments.

4 COORDINATING RESPONSES: JOINING UP EMERGENCY ACTION

In addition to adapting the roles of government entities to the requirements of complex emergencies, **effective multilevel governance demands the employment and continuous improvement of coordinating emergency actions.** It is usually suggested that this requirement becomes more important with increasing levels of decentralisation of countries to minimise risks of a fragmented emergency response [17]. In other words, it is not the level of decentralisation itself that has led to problems with past emergency responses but ineffective coordination. **Paying attention to and investing in better coordination in turn enable decentralisation and networked organisation, which so centrally assist greater adaptivity and agility.**

Coordination practices and mechanisms as part of multilevel emergency governance was a dedicated focus of interviews, consultations and workshops with government officials informing this policy brief. These revealed highly context-specific challenges as well as broader issues that allow for international learning and transferability. Above all, responding to complex emergencies requires the orientation of intervention around problems and challenges rather than predefined policy sectors, administrative boundaries or remits of individual government units. Emergency responses also concentrate on those critical outcomes of government action, which are produced by multiple government units and different areas of expertise.

Following the general case for integrated planning and holistic governance [21], coordinating the response to complex emergencies is informed by the more specific motivations to:

- improve the coherence and avoid contradictions of emergency policy and action
- take advantage of synergetic effects between emergency interventions
- avoid blind spots, inefficient duplication and redundancy of emergency responses
- overcome poor sequencing and one-step-at-a-time interventions compromising agility
- enhance social learning and capacity building linked to complex emergencies
- break organisational lock-in to escape institutional inertia and enable innovation
- respond to emergency interdependencies that cut across disciplinary and sectoral boundaries

4.1 THE EMERGENCY COORDINATION MECHANISMS

Given the central role of coordinated action as part of multi-level emergency governance, **Figure 1 presents and adapts a framework of prominent coordination mechanisms** [21] to the requirements of vertically integrated, cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional emergency decision-making and interventions. This framework differentiates technocratic coordination mechanisms with a focus on governance structures, processes, instruments and enabling conditions embedded in wider emergency politics with several overarching mechanisms.

A part of these overarching coordination mechanisms are gender-responsive and human rights-based norms and models. These are underpinned by principles of equal participation, representativeness, integrality, co-construction, inter-sectoriality and intersectionality which in turn enable greater coordination [15]. For example, inspiring emergency responses in this respect came from societies with female leaders such as New Zealand, Denmark and Iceland.

The following paragraphs spotlight some of the prominent mechanisms for emergency governance outlined in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Emergency Coordination Mechanisms

<p>OVERARCHING MECHANISMS EMERGENCY POLITICS</p>	<p>0.1 Political norms and models</p> <p>0.2 Party political negotiation and agreement</p> <p>0.3 Electoral legitimacy and agenda setting, political leadership and authority</p>
<p>MECHANISMS 01: EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES</p>	<p>MECHANISMS 02: EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE PROCESSES</p>
<p>1.1 Adjust sectoral/geographical boundaries to emergency needs</p> <p>1.2 Expand and concentrate power of the executive</p> <p>1.3 Promote consultation and consensus building through multi-stakeholder councils or platforms</p>	<p>2.1 Iterative management of interrelated tasks and milestones</p> <p>2.2 Incorporate cross-sector perspective in all sectoral decisions</p> <p>2.3 Enhance collaboration of key stakeholders for each emergency nexus</p>
<p>MECHANISMS 03: EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS</p>	<p>MECHANISMS 04: EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE ENABLING CONDITIONS</p>
<p>3.1 Make extensive use of information and communication technology</p> <p>3.2 Establish emergency strategies and action plans as central reference</p> <p>3.3 Re-distribute resource based on multi-criteria assessment</p>	<p>4.1 Invest in capacity building of individuals, teams and society</p> <p>4.2 Carefully appoint emergency leadership teams based on specific emergency requirements</p> <p>4.3 Foster knowledge and experience sharing alongside a collaborative culture</p>

Mechanism 1.2 Hierarchies: expand and concentrate power of the executive.

The concentration of authority remains a fundamental coordinating mechanism in public policy and governance. As part of responding to complex emergencies, it tends to be even more significant compared to normal mode governance as it enables radical intervention based on fast and effective decision-making. The concentration of power can occur horizontally at the same government level when remits the executive branch are temporarily expanded or sectoral oversight is bundled for example under direct leadership of mayor or regional governor. It can also happen vertically, where it tends to be closely associated with centralisation and shifting powers to higher-level governments.

Unsurprisingly, conventional emergency response protocols such as the US National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) maintain considerable hierarchies and provide structural stability to emergency governance [23]. These frameworks provide guidance to subnational governments on setting up appropriate structures and procedures for responding to emerging threats. For example, the CalEPA Emergency Response Management Committee is the state of California’s unified emergency response system, established in compliance with the NIMS [22]. **Depending on the type of complex emergencies, hierarchical coordination can be a critical point of departure for dealing with an emergency** – particularly for the highest level of urgencies and at the beginning of emergency responses. Centralised coordination can also help to establish data protocols and standards, which are then applied to all involved territories.

Practical examples of hierarchical coordination mechanisms also include tailored roles of organisations. This cuts across ministries entrusted with specific cross-cutting responsibilities or establishing new central coordination bodies such as emergency councils, committees or task forces [1]. **However, with long emergencies and a greater frequency of emergency modes, coordination advantage of centralisation can evaporate and needs to be complemented by more agile mechanisms that empower decentralised government entities** [23].

Mechanism 1.3 Networks: enabling multi-stakeholder councils, platforms and teams.

Agile coordination structures embrace horizontal networks to reduce the reliance on hierarchies and to overcome horizontal administrative divisions. In cases where urgent action is needed, **the empowerment of local teams and individuals to make decisions on the ground can ensure that context-specific responses take into consideration the latest time-sensitive information available.** Teamwork and networked coordination require trust. Where possible, emergency governance efforts can build on networks of trust that were established prior to the emergency mode.

Source: expanded based on Rode 2018

One example of the success of multi-stakeholder teams in responding to COVID-19 has been in Gauteng, South Africa, where a pre-existing research partnership between the provincial government and the Gauteng City Region Observatory (GCRO) enabled the collection of localised data and the development of ward-based emergency responses within the wider context of the provincial emergency strategy [24].

Mechanism 2.1 Iterative processes: combining initial planning with continuous adjustments.

Joining up interrelated tasks under emergency conditions requires the establishment of a clear point of departure followed by frequent and widespread communication across organisational boundaries [23]. **Permanent communication between key stakeholders then enables continuous adjustments.** Initiating multi-stage emergency approaches usually involves immediate reaction under the lead of centralised authority, which can then devolve responsibilities for subsequent adjustments. Iterative processes then also enable experimentation, test beds and policy labs, which require fast learning based on immediate feedback.

Mechanism 2.2 Prepared engagement: enhance collaboration of key stakeholders for each emergency nexus.

Establishing 'latent' processes that detail how cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional teams and stakeholders can be fully engaged with each other. These can be activated under emergency modes to avoid having to invent engagement strategies on the spot. These teams can also be positioned as a safe space for civil servants and bureaucrats to overcome strict hierarchical thinking and to embrace more innovative, result- rather than reporting-driven actions. Engagement protocols also help to indicate which emergency processes are over- and under-resourced and can include suggestions for transferring staff from other administrations or bodies in support of overburdened emergency teams [1].

Mechanism 3.1 Digital tools: make extensive use of technology, data sharing, and information management

Modern communication and information technology, above all the mobile internet, big data and geo-referencing, has revolutionised how data is generated, aggregated, analysed and shared. **Digital information sharing, e-participation and app-based data input has also led to an instant access to up-to-date information, which facilitates time-sensitive decision-making.** It has also a considerable potential to improve the transparency of emergency governance processes. The COVID-19 response has been the strongest indication so far of how digital tools can be effectively employed as part of a much broader turn towards digital-era governance [25].

Critical enablers for more frequent and flexible communication are various virtual communication and digital collaboration tools. As was reported throughout the interviews, workshops and consultations, video conferencing, chat apps and virtual collaboration boards are increasingly effective at supporting and connecting elected officials, government employees and key stakeholders who are part of the emergency response ecosystem.

Available at the adequate level of security with dedicated VPN connections, these tools have already shown that they can entirely change the dynamics and possibilities of networked collaboration [1].

Mechanism 4.1 Capacity building: Invest in capacity building of individuals, teams and society.

Contributing to a coordinated response to long, complex emergencies inevitably requires unprecedented levels of capacity building for all involved actors. **As these emergencies are beyond social memory, they cannot only rely on pre-existing knowledge, skills and experiences and instead close the formal capacity building and learning-while-doing gap.** New coordinating capacities will require doing both at the same time and heavily rely on making use of digital learning and exchange platforms.

A particular type of capacity building is required for emergency leadership. These capacities are a further, fundamental component for enabling better emergency coordination. Of particular importance here is not just the ability of the senior leadership team but of middle managers who need to enable cross-sectoral teamwork by stepping back and also by protecting their work from political and other influences [26].

4.2 DEEP DIVE: VERTICAL COORDINATION FOR RESPONSE STRATEGIES

The vertical coordination of strategic emergency responses between different levels of government enables cities and regions to play a key role beyond operational aspects of emergency governance.

Given the time pressures on the development of response strategies, this invariably requires a complex system of coordination, communication and data analysis across all levels of government. The exact features of vertical coordination systems will depend on the country and governance context.

For example, vertical coordination in the case of the pandemic response had to address critical issues such as 'the organisation of financial support schemes, lockdown measures, ownership and/or accountability of measures, allocation of medical equipment, overlapping activities, public communication and cross-border issues' [1]. Rapidly changing location-based asymmetries in the health and economic impacts of the virus and infection control measures added complexity to the task.


4.2.1 Identifying bottom-up strategic emergency response priorities

One of the major challenges associated with vertical coordination at the subnational level is the issue of identifying emergency response priorities across different jurisdictions so that they can be effectively communicated to higher levels of government. Observing how subnational governments negotiate potentially differing interests at the vertical level, several patterns can be discerned.

Firstly, priority identification can be organised along two main axes (Figure 2). The first axis is the extent to which priorities are adapted and aligned to global agendas or established based on conditions in local contexts. In many instances, these may actually be the same and what is differentiated here is the initial starting point.

The second axis is the extent to which priorities are identified as a result of deliberation and consensus-building across local government networks, or whether priorities emerge as a result of the influence of leading cities and regions.

Figure 2: Priority Identification Diamond – Bottom-up Emergency Coordination by Context Types



Source: Authors, refined during workshops

4.2.2 Strategic decision-making access and input


In most countries, major emergency response strategies are established at the national level, often by the executive, with varying levels of input from lower tiers of government. **The extent to which subnational governments can influence these response strategies depends largely on pre-existing multi-level government frameworks and traditions.** The rationale for increasing the level of strategic influence by cities and regions once again builds on the need for greater adaptivity and for experimental approaches that can be co-led by devolved administrations.

Based on observations of recent complex emergencies, four broad types of strategic decision-making access and input can be identified (Figure 3). This differentiation was developed ahead of workshops and consultations through which it was extensively tested and confirmed. It is important to note that these models are not mutually exclusive, and that many cities and regions influence top-level decision-making through a combination of these channels.

Type A: direct access by subnational governments to emergency cabinet

Type A is the most comprehensive form of access and input. In this scenario, cities and regions are granted official and full representation to emergency decision-making bodies. This could be in the form of ex-officio representatives or via a dedicated minister or secretary. This model of access is more likely to emerge in federal countries in which emergency strategies are relatively decentralised and tight coordination between the governing units is necessary for a coherent response.

Figure 3: Four Types of Access and Inputs in Relation to National/State Level Strategic Decision-Making



Source: Authors, refined during workshops

Type B: input via an emergency committee

Under this model, cities and regions are represented on committees that report to national decision-making bodies. For example, in Colombia, the Minister of Health has been convening the mayors of cities that are most affected by the pandemic so that the emergency response strategy can be informed by regional differences in the impact of the virus. This model represents a formal channel through which cities and regions can raise their concerns and priorities; however, unlike in the Type A model, this does not imply a seat at the decision-making table.

Type C: input via pre-existing non-emergency networks

City and regional governments can also influence the central decision-making bodies through pre-existing non-emergency networks. In the UK, the Local Government Association meets regularly with government ministers and provides evidence to technical committees and inquiries on the COVID-19 pandemic.

Type C input seems to be the most common of all four models of access and input. During the workshops, participants identified ‘task forces within existing city networks’ as the most common form of influencing national level emergency strategy. This emerged as the most familiar form of influence for participants from both unitary countries and federal countries.

Type D: informal and ad-hoc input via multiple modes

Informal and ad-hoc input could include input via official channels at consultative moments, lobbying key decision makers, appealing to the media for broad public support, or building channels of influence through personal relationships. Workshop participants from centralised countries, for example Argentina, identified personal relationships as critical to their coordination with national governments. However, even in decentralised countries, this informal influencing model can be useful, particularly when there are political disagreements between national and local governments or when more formal channels of influence have been blocked. This was the case in Brazil in December 2020 when 17 state governors joined forces to advocate for the extension of emergency measures when they were due to expire [27].

During the workshops it was noted that under these less formal modes of representation, it is likely that smaller cities and regions will be at a disadvantage in attempting to influence national strategy as compared with wealthy capital regions with more resources and political clout. If cities and regions are to actively feed into national emergency response strategies and ensure that measures taken are responsive to local communities, it is critical that they are adequately resourced.

4.2.3 Coordination lessons from COVID-19

At the outset of the COVID-19, some national governments were able to mobilise pre-existing coordination mechanisms. In South Africa, for instance, the Disaster Management Act of 2002 was triggered, which provided a comprehensive framework for the multilevel coordination of emergency response measures and clearly outlined the roles and responsibilities of each government unit. **However, the intensity of coordination required to meet the challenges of the complex emergency meant that for some governments, pre-existing coordination mechanisms were insufficient and new bodies had to be introduced.**

In Australia, a National Cabinet was established at the beginning of the pandemic to facilitate more frequent negotiation and compromise between states with a faster response time than decisions made by national parliament. The Cabinet is chaired by the prime minister and includes ministers of the states and territories [28]. Meetings are held regularly via video conferencing platforms, and the procedures are designed to be streamlined with a focus on a small number of national priorities.


As the response periods of complex emergencies such as global pandemics or climate breakdown are much longer than those of conventional emergencies, there is a divergence in the coordination and multilevel governance demands of these two categories of emergencies. **In the case of complex emergencies, it is critical that vertical coordination structures are durable yet responsive to rapidly changing circumstances.** Coordination mechanisms must be designed to facilitate easy communication between key actors, making full use of digital platforms. Structures must be adapted or developed so that there can be sustained, regular and multidirectional communication between actors at each government level.

4.3 THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATIONS AND CITY NETWORKS

To support emergency coordination efforts and strengthen the input of local government on national response strategies **it is essential to better integrate local government associations and city networks within national government responses.** These networks are typically already embedded within the national system of governance and have a unique capacity to convene diverse groups of cities and regions. They are therefore ideally placed to take on key roles during emergencies.

Local government associations provide a wide range of functions during emergency periods, ranging from more formalised roles, such as representing city and regional interests on national committees and decision-making bodies, to less formalised roles including facilitating solidarity between subnational governments and providing platforms for information sharing. Figure 4 shows the range of roles played by local government associations during complex emergencies.

Figure 4: Emergency Roles of City Networks and Local Government Associations



The importance of local government associations and city networks tends to be more significant in countries where subnational governments do not have Type A access to strategic decision-making during emergencies. In these circumstances, associations can promote cooperative decision-making or consultation processes among local governments and enable the identification of priorities in a systematic manner. They can then advocate for the incorporation of these interests at the national strategic level [1]. During the COVID-19 response, this has largely been the case in South Africa, where representatives from the Local Government Association (SALGA) have been meeting with national ministers and reporting to the National Coronavirus Command Council, the governing body leading the pandemic response. Given the necessary resources, local government associations are also well placed to take on practical coordinating roles during an emergency, for example by distributing funds or medical resources. In Uganda, the Ministry of Local Governments released emergency funds directly to the Local Government Association (ULGA) to be distributed to local governments [29].

Beyond these more formalised roles, workshop participants stressed the crucial importance of the role played by local government associations in facilitating knowledge and experience exchange. Under circumstances of extreme uncertainty, and with no established roadmap for action, communication and information sharing between cities and regions can make a huge difference. This information sharing need not only be focused on high-level policy strategising, but it can also help provide cities and regions with practical advice and useful contacts. In Bulgaria, for example, the National Association of Municipalities (NAMRB) established a communication platform for mayors during the initial stages of the pandemic, which was used to circulate details of companies providing emergency medical equipment and PPE [1]. At the international level, city networks

have also created platforms for knowledge sharing across different global regions, for example UCLG’s Live Learning Experience and Metropolis’ Cities for Global Health.

These knowledge and experience exchange functions may be even more important for the response to the climate emergency, particularly as local governments in many countries have been leading on green transitions independently of the action (or inaction) of national governments. For example UK100, a network of locally elected leaders in the UK committed to switching to 100% clean energy by 2050 has been created to enable local authorities to share knowledge on local energy transitions, in addition to petitioning the national government to devote more resources to this effort [30].

5 MULTILEVEL EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following five principles for governing complex emergencies build on the most relevant ones for multilevel emergency governance out of a total of ten principles established in the EGI Policy Brief 02. They are complemented by a more specific set of recommendations for each principle.

- Emergency governance requires government to be in the driving seat** as convener in chief. Emergency responses require the leadership of trusted governments: “emergency management is the quintessential governmental role” [31].

 - Recommendation 1.1: Ensure transparency and accountability to foster public legitimacy and trust of governments at all levels as central conveners and decision makers for complex emergencies.
 - Recommendation 1.2: Promote stable public institutions at the core, flexibility around the edges.
 - Recommendation 1.3: Support capacity building to ensure governments at all levels have the ability to take the lead responding to complex emergencies.
 - Recommendation 1.4: Promote inclusive governance models that incorporates diversity of representation, views and concerns to build more authentic definitions of citizenship.
- Multilevel emergency governance can build on, but needs to go beyond, normal mode multilevel governance.** Multilevel involvement replaces single lead roles with multiple lead organisations, which coordinate resource allocation and decision making [32]. Emergency leaders at all levels need to be held accountable.

 - Recommendation 2.1: Responsibilities need to be clearly assigned to different levels and units of government to foster adaptability and agility as part of the response to complex emergencies.

- Recommendation 2.2: Build adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate vertical cooperation involving key institutions representative of all levels of government in decision making. Clarify and communicate which institutions regulate centralisation and decentralisation when facing complex emergencies.
 - Recommendation 2.3: Emergency governance responsibilities at each government level need to be funded appropriately.
3. **Emergency governance needs to embrace a systems and experimental approach** rather than adopting sectoral perspectives. This translates to cluster and nexus approaches which guide and direct sectoral responses that are then re-aggregated as part of an integrated response by the coordinating institutions.
- Recommendation 3.1: Build adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate cross-sectoral cooperation.
 - Recommendation 3.2: Implement data and information management including open data and sharing approaches that standardise the most critical data and maximises availability of information, enabling all stakeholders to input and access standardised information real time.
 - Recommendation 3.3: Enable experimentation, piloting and temporal solutions to dealing with complex emergencies by moving away from zero failure culture.
4. **Emergency governance requires hybridity, combining hierarchical and network governance.** Avoid a simple assignment of strategic, tactical and operational modes by governance scale (whereby national equals strategic, and local equals operational) and instead mixing modes and scales leads to more flexible emergency governance. Intensive communication and collaboration from all key stakeholders as part of super-networked governance is critical at the point of transitioning into an emergency mode.
- Recommendation 4.1: Clearly define the strategic decision-making access and input which is available to regional and city governments to engage with national and state governments during complex emergencies.
 - Recommendation 4.2: Build adequate coordination mechanisms to facilitate cross-jurisdictional cooperation embracing bottom-up coordination in the shadow of hierarchies. This is particularly necessary in metropolitan areas where different local governments and public institutions share different governance dimensions and need to collaborate to develop common and coherent responses.
 - Recommendation 4.3: Ensure the mainstreaming of gender-sensitive and inclusive governance, acknowledging women’s and feminist leaderships’ contribution to facilitating a more collaborative and networked approach to emergency governance with a strong emphasis on upholding the human rights of the populations most vulnerable to the impacts of complex emergencies.
5. The choice of an emergency governance framework depends on the need for alignment with existing governance structures, the attributes of key network actors and the context of the emergency. **There is no ‘one size fits all’ approach** to suit all local circumstances and contexts. The governance of complex emergencies must not be standardised and should take advantage of international knowledge and solidarity networks.
- Recommendation 5.1: For international learnings and practice exchanges, consider available public resources (higher, medium and lower income countries), type of national system (unitary to federal), and political system.
 - Recommendation 5.2: Take advantage of international networks, and particularly from local and regional governments networks efforts that have been active to support emergency efforts, to facilitate knowledge exchange and promote peer to peer learning and cooperation to disseminate and adapt lessons learned and foster solidarity.

LOOKING FORWARD

Written by Tony Travers, Professor and Associate Dean of the School of Public Policy, the London School of Economics and Political Science

COVID-19 has created challenges for city and regional governments throughout the world. Many subnational administrations had for many years undertaken emergency planning. Earthquakes, floods, droughts, civil disorder, fires, terrorism, economic failure and, of course, pandemics featured in most governments' 'risk registers', but we now know there is a great deal of difference between a 'hypotheticals' exercise to stress-test such arrangements and real-life management of a day-to-day crisis that will have lasting effects for three years or more.

City, local and regional governments have had to work within multilevel coordination machinery to deliver health programmes and also to ensure other aspects of society continued to function. The respective roles of different spheres of government have become clearer during the pandemic. Upper levels of government, particularly national/federal administrations, have had the economic firepower to borrow spectacular amounts of money to sustain public services and replace lost tax revenue while also delivering short-term business and employee protection. Subnational governments, even at the state/provincial level, did not generally have this capacity to borrow cheaply (or print money) so they could smooth out some of the impacts of the pandemic.

City and regional governments did have important responsibilities in ensuring provision such as healthcare, transport, basic services and public safety. Local train, tram and bus services saw their fare income cut by up to 95 per cent. Mayors and other city leaders have had to negotiate with state and/or national governments to secure bailout funding to keep services going. Similarly, public health rules and enforcement have often been delivered at a city or local level. Municipalities are closer to their populations and thus have a better understanding about the local use of state power.

Proximity to residents and businesses has proved to be a vital feature of the overall government response to lockdowns, securing protective equipment, tracing systems and, crucially, vaccination programmes. Providing public buildings, having the capacity to deliver on the ground, logistics, and even knowing who lives where have proved to be vital elements in getting COVID-19 under control. Accessing minority populations is something that cities, municipalities and local legislators can do far more effectively than distant governments located in state or national capitals.

While the pandemic has made it clearer than hitherto that there are different roles for different spheres of government, it has also revealed challenges in achieving consistency and coordination. In the absence of pre-existing multilevel emergency governance mechanisms, in many countries arrangements have had to be developed quickly. Nationally collected and analysed data has had to be cascaded through regional, city and local institutions. Supply chains for protective equipment and vaccines have had to be made effective, linking national health departments and research institutes with on-the-ground city and local delivery mechanisms.

Institutions representing networks of cities, states/regions and municipalities have had both political and practical purposes. Only politicians and their executive officers can empower the linking together of institutions at different levels. Representative groups representing healthcare professionals, emergency planners and, indeed, not-for-profit organisations can help facilitate the delivery of emergency services. City and other subnational governments have provided local knowledge, trust and legitimacy.

City governments will have learned a great deal from the COVID-19 pandemic. They will have found which logistical chains are strong and which need improving. They will know more about the quality of the data they hold and also about their capacity to work seamlessly with other parts of government. They also now have a role in thinking through economic recovery. Will city centres recover fully and, if not, what are the consequences for the future location of homes, employment and public transport?

Do social conditions need to improve for low-income households, particularly in terms of their access to basic services, decent houses or green space? What is the future relationship between downtowns and outer centres within a city? How can the countryside be saved from sprawl? Looking ahead, city and municipal governments will need to reflect on the first eighteen months of the pandemic and make proposals to improve multilevel government working, to restore their financial strength and to ensure the legacy of COVID-19 is one they planned for. Accidental long-term outcomes such as urban sprawl or greater unemployment within deprived districts would be a bad place to end up.

Most subnational and city government survived the COVID-19 pandemic with their reputations unharmed. It has often been national/federal governments that have suffered criticism over their policies towards protective equipment, lockdowns, overseas travel, vaccination programmes or economic support grants. But there is much still to be done. The biggest test for city and municipal governments may still lie ahead.

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS

Written by Rogelio Biazzi, General Coordinator of the Cabinet, Municipality of Rosario, Argentina

By now we are all very clear that one of the key words to define our current society is 'change'. It seems like an oxymoron, but change has come to our society to stay. In this context that has shaken many institutions, unleashed great debates, and generated great confusion, governments have had to adapt. The crisis we are experiencing is a complex process and it is evolving at such a pace that we have not yet had enough time to understand it in all its magnitude. In times of uncertainty, such as the current moment, we must follow a path that begins with reflection, coordination and agreement.

For local governments in particular, two key urgencies have emerged from this crisis. Firstly, there must be a vertical change in governance to aid agreements and coordination between levels of government. Due to the different scales and contexts, interactions between actors at different levels of government often involve differing approaches to decision-making. At this moment, there is an opportunity to analyse the classic paradigm of top-down or bottom-up decision-making by studying the interdependence of relationships that may exist between various actors in a given territory, to generate a governance model in which there are more horizontal relationships between actors of different levels and sectors of society. This requires networked interaction between administrations in emergency situations, with actors who share a common interest in certain policies and can collaborate on the realisation of shared interests.

Secondly, there must be a change from traditional sectoral divisions that produce 'silos' that focus on problems from a partial perspective, to working in cross-cutting teams with multidisciplinary contributions. There should be a shift from organisations divided into parcels to disruptive public administrations that seek collaborative solutions in crisis contexts, generating scenarios of greater governance capacity and decisional effectiveness to face management challenges and coordination deficits. More collaboration and integration are necessary for decision-making and the implementation of concrete actions.

The interdependence between states is increasingly intense. The titanic task of managing emergencies has made us aware of the co-responsibility that exists between levels of government that coexist in the same territory. After a year and a half of working intensively on change management to improve ourselves and be able to serve society in unprecedented contexts, we are only scratching the surface of our ability as people to learn, communicate and create together. But there is good news: the process is already under way and things are changing profoundly. There is a silent revolution in motion, and we are still alive and moving forward.

APPENDIX

KEY GOVERNMENT POWERS FOR MULTILEVEL EMERGENCY GOVERNANCE

- a. **Political powers:** these are the powers associated with political responsibilities, control and decision-making of different government units. These cut across legislative as well as executive branches of government.
- b. **Administrative powers:** these are the powers associated with the management, planning and operations of different public bureaucracies. These involve general as well as sector-specific public administrations.
- c. **Fiscal powers:** these are the powers associated with taxing and spending responsibilities of different government units. Such responsibilities include decisions on tax bases, tax rates and spending allocations as well as overseeing broader financing instruments.

DIRECTIONS OF COORDINATION FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION

Two fundamental directions of coordination are usually differentiated: vertical and horizontal. While the coordination of responses between different government entities to join up emergency action adopts the vertical definition, two different components of horizontal coordination can be differentiated. The total of three directions of coordination are:

- a. **Vertical coordination** includes coordinating activities across different levels of government such as between cities, metropolitan, regions, state and national governments.
- b. **Sectoral coordination** covers coordinating activities across different policy sectors and domains such as health, education, social services, security, utilities, transport, etc. In many instances, this includes coordination across different public administrations at the same governance level and is therefore considered a form of horizontal coordination.
- c. **Territorial coordination** or cross-jurisdictional coordination refers to coordinating activities between neighbouring jurisdictions or jurisdictions that form part of a larger common territory. In the absence of a higher-level government assisting this form of coordination, territorial coordination is also considered as a second form of horizontal coordination.

ADAPTIVITY AND AGILITY

Building on [7] and [26], this section identifies broad principles and characteristics of adaptivity and agility most relevant for responding to complex emergencies.

Adaptivity

Crisis and emergency responses demand a considerable degree of flexibility and adaptivity by all involved institutions. Additionally, multilevel emergency governance not only requires each contributing government unit to perform accordingly but demands adaptivity of the multilevel, cross-sectoral governance system itself. Adaptivity in governance is characterised as ‘the ability to deal with complex societal issues involving many stakeholders, diverging interests and uncertainty about the actions to be taken’ [7].

Adaptivity recognises the mismatch between emergency mode governance requirements and the institutional arrangements that are usually designed to facilitate normal mode governance. Adaptive governance suggests that a greater responsiveness to crisis and external shocks is supported by multi-stakeholder engagement, making use of decentralised knowledge while combining centralisation and decentralisation efforts [7]. Clearly designed institutional arrangements enable adaptivity once governments have to shift to emergency modes.

Through adaptivity, learning emerges as the core governance effort and, as such, conflicts between governance levels are accepted. However, the aim is for learning to be productive, while compromises to critical operations or the credibility of key stakeholders have to be avoided. One important prerequisite for the required learning is a tolerance for paradox such as rapid and considered decision-making, hierarchy and networks, and centralisation and decentralisation.

Agility

Agility is a further quality in emergency governance that this policy brief builds on. It is primarily concerned with keeping pace with rapid change and crisis demands. This time-sensitivity of agile approaches is a key difference to slower plan-based, one-step-at-a-time interventions (sometimes referred to as waterfall approaches) [11]. Agility embraces initial planning but accepts change throughout the implementation process, which is particularly relevant for emergency management and policies.

In management and governance, agility originally emerged through the field of software development and is commonly understood as ‘responding to changing public needs in an efficient way’ [26]. It entails a continuous process of improvement and overall faster delivery aiming for resilience, fluidity and flexibility. A central dimension of agility is team-focused efforts. These teams are cross-functional, with a strong purpose, and commitment to deliver [12]. Leaders primarily operate as enablers of teams rather than directing and controlling their work.

Greater responsiveness to changing circumstances, the discovery of and response to local needs is enabled by working in smaller increments, more frequent review and immediate feedback. This also requires communication channels that are established for best knowledge sharing and radical transparency [12]. Agility implies continuous input by citizens and/or their local representatives/governments as part of multilevel emergency governance.

Agile approaches are not inherently in conflict with public administration values, and agile governance acknowledges proactive intervention and a public sector shaping developments [33]. Beyond relying on centralised coordination, hybrid forms with horizontal networks operating in the shadow of hierarchies [21] assist the coordination across different government entities.

Avoiding stability trade-offs

The characteristics of adaptivity and agility as part of multilevel emergency governance can imply tensions with institutional stability, which must be addressed. A full awareness of the following potential trade-offs is an important first step:

- teams vs line-managed bureaucracies
- experimentation vs risk aversity/organisational reputation
- case by case evaluation vs administrative law
- new organisational behaviour vs standard operating procedures
- outcomes vs rules
- responding to change vs following a plan
- encouraging wider participation vs control
- fostering self-organisation vs centralised government
- individual discretion vs bureaucratic procedures

Increasing agility and adaptivity requires temporal or permanent change of existing multilevel governance systems. As part of necessary reforms, governments have to consider emergency policy tools and priorities, how to mobilise and coordinate actions across government units, the relevance of place-based approaches and how to establish clear leadership while also reinforcing the trust of the general public in government institutions [17].

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